Author: fro

 

AreaS-medlem Håvard Friis Nilsen høstet gode kritikker fra mange hold for sin nyeste bok, som kom ut før jul. Etter å ha vært rundt på mange scener og podcaster og pratet om boka, ble det endelig en presentasjon og samtale om boka på “hjemmebane”.

Tid og sted: 23. feb. 2023 19:00–21:00, Litteraturhuset i Fredrikstad

Last year we saw the overturning of Roe v. Wade, a historic Supreme Court decision that had guaranteed the right to abortion in the U.S. for almost 50 years.

In this AreaS seminar, Prof. Kirsti K. Cole and Prof. Johanna M. Wagner present the Crisis Pregnancy Centers (CPCs) that have bourgeoned across the U.S. since the latter 20th century. Cole and Wagner argue that while the CPCs present themselves as offering a trusted service to desperate women, their websites often include misinformation, deceptive facts and figures to dissuade them from getting an abortion.

Want to learn more about abortion debates, the role and communication of Crisis Pregnancy Centers in the U.S.? Come join an interesting seminar at the House of Literature in Fredrikstad on February 23, 19:00-21:00. The seminar will be in English.

Kirsti K. Cole is a Professor of Rhetoric and Composition at Minnesota State University.

Johanna M. Wagner is Professor of English (Literature) at Østfold University College and member of the research group AreaS.

Crisis Pregnancy Centers is the topic of a chapter written by Cole and Wagner in an upcoming AreaS anthology about Trust and Digital Society.

Arrangør: Forskningsgruppen AreaS ved Høgskolen i Østfold

Hva kjennetegner de rike olje- og gassproduserende landene på den arabiske halvøy? Hvilken rolle spiller de som migrasjonsland for folk med ulik tro fra nær sagt hele verden? Hvordan påvirker disse landene internasjonal klimapolitikk, finanspolitikk og sportspolitikk? Dette er noen av spørsmålene forfatterne kommer inn på, når de kaster lys over særtrekk ved disse landene i Midtøsten.

Berit Thorbjørnsrud er professor ved Universitetet i Oslo.

Jon Nordenson er landrådgiver for Midtøsten i Landinfo og var forsker og postdoktor ved Universitetet i Oslo tidligere.

Rania Maktabi er førsteamanuensis ved Høgskolen i Østfold.

Boksamtalen er i regi av Forskningsgruppen AreaS ved Høgskolen i Østfold, Cappelen Damm Akademisk og Fredrikstad bibliotek.

30. november kunngjorde Eric Zemmour at han stiller som kandidat til presidentvalget i Frankrike i april 2022. Han klarte å prege den tidlige fasen av valgkampen med et budskap som for mange virker sjokkerende. Det er likevel viktig å skjønne hva som motiverer ham. Zemmour kan egentlig forstås på to nivåer. Det ene er personlig. Det andre er politisk.

Familien til Zemmour kom fra et fransk Algerie som forsvant etter at krigen mot FLN tok slutt i 1962. 1,5 million franskmenn forlot da alt de eide i full hast. Selv opplevde han aldri flukten. Familien forlot landet så tidlig som i 1958, og Eric ble født i Frankrike. Han vokste likevel opp med minnet om et fedreland som var blitt borte. Han slet med å finne sin plass i en relativt fattig forstad utenfor bykjernen i Paris og i et fransk samfunn som ikke var så begeistret for å ta imot fransk-algeriere. Zemmour møtes med skrekk og gru når han foreslår at franskfødte muslimer som ikke vil ta innover seg republikkens lover, skal kastes ut. Hans svar er at algerierne gjorde det samme mot franskmenn i 1962 – det er altså fullt mulig.

I tillegg har Zemmour berberske og jødiske røtter. Berberne levde i Algerie før islam kom dit. De måtte etter hvert godta arabernes styre. Jøder i det franske Algerie fikk på sin side fransk statsborgerskap ved Crémieux-loven i 1870. Fra å være annenrangs borgere på linje med muslimer, ble de likestilt med franskmenn fra fastlandet og skilt fra den muslimske befolkningen. Vichy-regimet fratok franske jøder fra Algerie sitt franske statsborgerskap i oktober 1940. De fikk det tilbake i oktober 1943 etter at det frie Frankrike inntok Algerie og Marokko.

Denne bakgrunnen preger Zemmour på flere måter. For det første er historiesynet hans tuftet på minnet om et Algerie han ble frarøvet. Det kan brukes på mange vis. For eksempel: Det som skjedde der må ikke skje igjen i Frankrike, ved at landet islamiseres og franskmenn byttes ut med (nord)afrikanere. Det ligger et underliggende element av hevn i Zemmours forhold til muslimer. Bakgrunnen har også gitt ham et sterkt behov for å overkompensere. Frankrikes sekulære system, kultur og skole ga Zemmour en ny sjanse, gjorde ham til et annet menneske enn han var født til å bli. Han omfavnet den franske revolusjonens idé om universelle borgere som frigjøres fullt ut fra etnisk eller religiøs tilhørighet. Et meritokratisk skolesystem og akademiske studier ved Sciences-Po i Paris lot ham klatre på rangstigen. Fransk assimileringspolitikk gjorde det mulig å ikke være fransk-algerisk, jøde og fattig. Det er han uendelig takknemlig for.

Zemmour nådde aldri helt til topps. To ganger mislyktes han med komme inn på elitehøyskolen som utdanner lederne i landets sentrale statsadministrasjon. Nederlaget vekket frustrasjon, samt mistenksomhet mot en intellektuell elite som han i første omgang ble utstøtt fra. Han valgte å bli journalist for å komme inn på innsiden, og det lyktes han med. Han er i dag en av Frankrikes mestselgende politiske forfattere. En slik suksess krever ofre. Skal man erobre pidestallen og bli en del av et idealisert Frankrike, må man gi avkall på egen fortid og egen kultur. Man må til og med gå så langt som å velge et «anstendig» fransk fornavn for sine barn for å bevise at man er assimilert. Avvik fra den republikanske modellen tolereres ikke. Et multikulturelt og multikonfesjonelt Frankrike fremstår som et mareritt.

Da han var journalist i den konservative avisen Le Figaro, snakket Zemmour lite om sin bakgrunn. I de senere årene har fortiden fått et formål: Det han selv klarte, må alle klare. Sårbarheten ble gradvis til intoleranse uten plass til kompromiss. Han har lest mest, vet best, og motsier ikke seg selv. Fra å være konservativ, gikk han til å bli reaksjonær.

Nittitallets radikale Zemmour ble byttet ut med den radikaliserte Zemmour på 2000-tallet. Han ble mer arisk enn arierne, mer ekstrem enn ekstremistene. Hans ytringer skremmer selv Marine le Pen, lederen for det radikale høyrepartiet Nasjonal Samling. Han omfavnes derimot av «det nye høyre» – monarkister som vil destabilisere republikken og identitære grupperinger. Han blir dessuten revisjonistisk når han omtaler Dreyfus-saken eller deportasjonen av jøder under Vichy-regimet.

Zemmour hevder et virkelighetsbilde der Frankrike er i borgerkrig mot innvandrerinvasjonen. Ideen hentet han fra Jean Raspails bok «De helliges leir» (1971). Taper man krigen, vil franskmenn byttes ut med ikke-kristne, ikke-hvite ikke-europeere. En annen inspirasjonskilde, forfatteren Renaud Camus, diktet i 2010 opp begrepet «Den store utskiftningen». Denne konspirasjonsteorien motiverte blant annet Brenton Tarrant i New Zealand i 2019. I USA spres den på ytre høyre som en mer spiselig retorikk enn white genocide.

Zemmour er politisk målbevisst. I motsetning til Trump er han kultivert, interessert i historie og han kan fransk politikk. Men i likhet med Trump er han opportunist. Hans reaksjonære utbrudd om islam, innvandring, muslimer eller kvinner betyr ikke at han mister besinnelsen. Han har klekket ut en plan for å kapre makt.

I 2012 vant sosialisten François Hollande presidentvalget ved å forene venstrekreftene. I 2017 vant Macron ved å forene moderate fra venstre og høyre. I 2022 sikter Zemmour til å gjøre noe ingen har klart før: å forene en svekket høyreside med de som synes at le Pen ikke er radikal nok. Sammen har de over 30 prosent av stemmene.

Zemmour har gjort regnestykket. For ham er de politiske partienes tid er forbi. Veien til Elysée-palasset står åpent for nye kandidater med høy kjendisfaktor. I 2017 veltet franske velgerne bordet da de stemte venstre-og høyresiden ut samtidig, for første gang siden 1958. Zemmour vil ta denne «oppryddingen» et skritt lenger i 2022.

Denne kronikken er skrevet av Franck Orban, førsteamanuensis ved HiØ, leder av forskergruppen AreaS og medprogramleder i podkasten «Frankrike forklart.»  Den ble publisert i Klassekampen 3. desember 2021.

De siste 20 årene har Skottland gjennomgått store politiske endringer, noe som har ført til at skotsk nasjonal identitet og Skottlands framtid som nasjon har kommet i fokus. Skotsk nasjonal identitet har blitt et relevant spørsmål for både politikere og vanlige skotter som i økende grad utforsker sin identitet og tilhørighet. I denne søken etter tilhørighet utenfor Storbritannia, har Norden kommet i fokus som et alternativ, og dermed som en rollemodell for Skottland. Hva er grunnlaget til ideen om skottenes nordiske identitet og hvilke elementer kjennetegner den? I hvilken grad er den kultur- og historie basert, eller politisk konstruert? AreaS-medlem Laila Berg (Institutt for språk, litteratur og kultur) levert nylig sin doktoravhandling om hvordan skotsk nasjonal identitet er i ferd med å bli redefinert og finpusset til å understreke sin nordiske dimensjon. 30. november presenterte hun sine funn på et AreaS seminar ved biblioteket/Remmen hvor hun snakket sammen med AreaS leder Franck Orban. Videoopptaket fra seminaret kan hentes her

I forbindelse med det franske presidentvalget neste år, tar vi for oss  den franske skribenten, forfatteren og politiske provokatøren på ytre høyre i fransk politikk – som 30. november kunngjorde at han stiller til valg som Frankrikes neste president. Han har blitt kalt en fransk Donald Trump, men stemmer dette? Hvilken bakgrunn har han og hva gjør han til en konkurrent av Marine Le Pen og av den franske høyreside? Elin Strand Larsen, nesteleder i AreaS, samtaler med Franck Orban, førsteamanuensis i fransk kultur og samfunn ved HiØ og leder i AreaS. Opptaket er lagd 25. november 2021 og kan hentes her.

Kansler Angela Merkel takker for seg etter 16 år ved makten. Hvilket Tyskland etterlater hun seg og hvilket land får vi etter forbundsdagsvalget som ble holdt 26. september 2021? Forskergruppen ved HiØ AreaS tok imot Kai Hanno Schwind 27. oktober 2021 med stor glede for å diskutere veien videre for Europas og EUs  sentralmakt. Kai er førsteamanuensis ved Høyskolen Kristiania.

Kai leder Kristianias forskergruppe kunstfag og er bl.a. medprogramleder for podkasten “Tyskerne.”

Videoopptaket fra seminaret kan hentes her.

It has been a couple of hard weeks for President Joe Biden. Even before the astonishing collapse of the American supported government in Afghanistan, his approval rating among American voters had slipped below 50% for the first time since he became President in January. This marked the end of the “honeymoon” period of his administration – a period in which Americans traditionally give a new president their support to see what he or she can do. The swift victory of the Taliban and the chaos that followed brought this period to a brutal end. In the first months of his presidency Biden had famously proclaimed to the world that “America is back!” on the world stage. But America’s swift and chaotic retreat from Kabul have led some commentators to ask if America hasn’t rather “Turned its back” on the world, rather than returned to it.

This article will concentrate on three of the great challenges Biden faced when he took office in January – taming the COVID epidemic, getting America’s economy up and running, and re-establishing America’s leading role in the world community. It will then briefly look to the future.

Taming COVID

When Joe Biden came to power his first priority was to get COVID under control. He promised to get 100 million American vaccinated in his first 100 days in office. He met that goal in only 58 days and went on to vaccinate 200 million before that same deadline Then he set goal of getting 70% of all American’s vaccinated with at least one dose of a vaccine by the 4^th of July, America’s national holiday.

And that proved to be too much.

The campaign faltered and stalled because of widespread skepticism of vaccination among Americans. In part, this was because of misinformation spread through the social media. But it also mirrored the deep-seated political division in the US between the Republicans and the Democrats. COVID had become “politicized” during the Trump years. At heart lay an inbuilt skepticism of “experts” and “science” among many Republicans (See graph below). This skepticism was reflected on the ground. Where the Republicans were strongest – in the South and West of the country – numbers of vaccinated were lowest. In the Northeast, Midwest and West Coast where Democrats were strongest, numbers were highest.

Source : https://news.gallup.com/poll/352397/democratic-republican-confidence-science-diverges.aspx?utm_source=alert&utm_medium=email&utm_content=morelink&utm_campaign=syndication

Eventually Biden did reach his goal of getting 70% of the population vaccinated in early August. Meanwhile, however, the new Delta variant of COVID had begun to spread quickly through the unvaccinated population of the South and West, causing a surge in infections and deaths. Although the vaccination program has picked up speed again, the difference in numbers between Republicans and Democrats and between different regions of the country continues, undermining the containment of COVID nationally. (1)

Getting America Back on Track

Like countries all over the world, COVID dealt a devastating blow to the American economy in 2020. Although the Trump administration passed several large relief bills, it was too little, too late in the view of many Democrats. They wanted major government spending like that found during the New Deal. That is why Biden’s campaign slogan had been “Build Back Better!” He wanted to spend up to $2 trillion rebuilding much of America’s crumbling infrastructure of roads, bridges, ports and railways.

That would be an enormous stimulus for the economy, creating hundreds of thousands of jobs. But he needed the cooperation of the Republicans to get the money. The election of 2020 had split the Senate 50/50 between the two parties, giving the Democrats the slimmest possible majority, using Vice President Kamala Harris’ one vote in case of a deadlock. For the infrastructure bill to pass the Senate Biden needed at least a 2/3s majority (in practice 67 of 100 votes). That meant gaining the support of 17 Republican Senators. In the poisonous and divided atmosphere of Washington, it did not seem likely that Biden would have much luck.

But Biden had spent decades as a Senator himself and knew the system well. Much to the surprise of his critics, he announced in June he had gotten the support of the necessary 17 Republican Senators for a $1.2 trillion infrastructure bill. In part, this was because the program was very popular among Americans in general and the Republicans did not want to be left behind. But it was also a testament to the persuasive power of Biden. He had promised to try to bring Republicans and Democrats together to find “bipartisan” solutions to Americans problems and this seemed to be a successful example of just that.

But Biden is not out of the woods yet. As this is written, the Senate’s infrastructure bill has been sent on to House of Representatives where it will undoubtedly be changed before it is sent back to the Senate to be passed once more (both the House and the Senate must agree on major bills before they are sent on to the President to be signed into law. This leaves room for lots more pushing and shoving.

It has been said that politics is “the art of the possible.” (2)  It still remains to be seen what is possible for Biden in today’s divided Washington.

The Forever War

Within his first months in power, Biden reversed many of the foreign policies of his predecessor, Donald Trump. He stopped the US from pulling out of the World Health Organization. He rejoined the Paris climate change agreement. He reestablished close relation with his NATO allies. He rallied the forces of democracy around the world to stand up to the growing power of autocratic governments, particularly in Russia and China. This is what he meant with “America is back!”

But there was one Trump policy that he did not reverse – ending America’s war in Afghanistan. Trump had made an agreement with the Taliban to withdraw US troops by May 1, 2021. Biden decided to honor that agreement, changing the deadline to the symbolic date of September 11, 2021. That date would mark the end of 20 years of continuous warfare – the longest war in American history, the “The Forever War.” Despite two decades of effort, $2 trillion dollars and more than 2500 American casualties (not to speak of the more than 100.000 Afghan casualties), it had proved impossible to crush the Taliban or create a strong pro-Western government in Kabul. The American public had grown tired of this never-ending effort. 70% favored getting out of Afghanistan. (3) That was why they had supported Trump’s agreement and that is why Biden decided to honor it.

Defeat and debacle  

But having an agreement and actually putting it into practice proved to be two very different things. Instead of an orderly withdrawal, when NATO troops started to leave in August the Taliban quickly overran the country. This created chaos. Tens of thousands of Afghan civilians who had worked with America and its NATO allies rushed to get out. Pictures of desperate Afghanis storming the airport in Kabul and clinging to American airplanes as they took off flashed around the world. The defeat of America and its allies in Afghanistan was swift, humiliating and complete. It sent shock waves around the world.

For many Europeans, it confirmed what former Norwegian Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundland had said years before – they could “no longer take for granted that they can trust the U.S., even on basic things.” (4)  German Chancellor Angela Merkel remarked that, “This is a particularly bitter development. Bitter, dramatic and terrible.” (5) Within the EU, there were renewed calls for a separate military force to make it less dependent on America in the future. Meanwhile, as one American commentator put it, “China and Russia are having a field day saying: This is your partner?” This was not the image of America Biden had been hoping for with the words, “America is back.” (6)

The impact was serious at home, as well.  Fully 69% felt Biden had failed to handle the  withdrawal successfully. The Republicans were particularly critical, with 82% saying they strongly disapproved of him. (7)  Biden’s general approval rating among Americans fell from just under 50% in early August to only 43% by early September. His disapproval rate rose to 51%. (8)

Looking ahead

As noted, it is not unusual for a president to lose support after the first “honeymoon” period. But the drop in support for Biden over the past weeks has been severe. It remains to be seen if this will have long-term effects. That will depend on a number of factors.

Will the COVID cases go on increasing? If so, what measures will he have to take to handle the situation and how popular (or unpopular) will they be?

Will Democrats and Republicans in the Senate continue to support his infrastructure bill (much less his more expensive plans)? One Democratic Senator has already hinted that he will not vote for anything that costly. (9)

Most importantly, what will happen in Afghanistan? If the country reverts to the brutal and repressive dictatorship the Taliban imposed in the 1990s, Afghanistan may haunt Biden for the rest of his four years in office. The worst case would be if the country again became a breeding ground for terrorist attacks worldwide. Both Biden’s and America’s international reputation hang in the balance.

At home, it is now a little over one year before the next “mid-term” election is held. All of the seats in the House of Representatives and one third of the seats Senate will be up for grabs (see Access to English: Social Studies, Congress – legislative powers, pp. 186-187). If the Democrats lose a majority in either chamber, it will give the Republicans the power to block most of Biden’s plans for the following two years, greatly weakening his presidency.

Therefore, Biden needs to quickly repair the damage to himself and the Democratic Party caused by Afghanistan. He has come out swinging, strongly defending his decision to withdraw from the war in a speech on August 31;

“I was not going to extend this forever war,..I simply do not believe that the safety and security of America is enhanced by continuing to deploy thousands of American troops and spending billions of dollars a year in Afghanistan…I give you my word: With all of my heart, I believe this is the right decision, a wise decision, and the best decision for America.” (10)

The American people will have one year to make up their minds if they agree with him. Meanwhile the rest of the world will watch developments in Afghanistan anxiously.

NOTES ON SOURCES

1. “The US has reached Biden’s July 4 goal to vaccinate 70% of adults — about a month late,” August 2, 2021
   https://edition.cnn.com/us/live-news/coronavirus-pandemic-vaccine-updates-08-02-21/h_dd5447ed2fbe61869b93df78e85bbcc5

2.  “Politics is the art of the possible, the attainable — the art of the next best.” – Otto von Bismarck

https://www.goodreads.com/quotes/424187-politics-is-the-art-of-the-possible-the-attainable

3. “US Public Supports Withdrawal From Afghanistan,” August 9, 2021

https://www.thechicagocouncil.org/commentary-and-analysis/blogs/us-public-supports-withdrawal-afghanistan

4.  “America is Back – but for How Long?” June 14, 2021

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/world/2021-06-14/america-back-how-long

5/6. “Biden promised allies ‘America is back.’ Chaotic Afghanistan withdrawal is making them fear it’s still ‘America First.’” August 19, 2021

https://edition.cnn.com/2021/08/18/politics/america-is-back-joe-biden-afghanistan/index.html

7. “Majority of U.S. public favors Afghanistan troop withdrawal; Biden criticized for his handling of situation,” August 31, 2021

https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2021/08/31/majority-of-u-s-public-favors-afghanistan-troop-withdrawal-biden-criticized-for-his-handling-of-situation/

8. “This poll number will send Democrats into a panic,” September 2, 2021

https://edition.cnn.com/2021/09/02/politics/biden-approval-midterms-democrats/index.html

9.  “Joe Manchin voted to advance the $3.5 trillion budget bill — now he says Democrats should press pause,” September 2, 2021

https://www.cnbc.com/2021/09/02/joe-manchin-opposes-3point5-trillion-biden-democratic-spending-bill.html

10. “Remarks by President Biden on the End of the War in Afghanistan,” August 31, 2021

https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/08/31/remarks-by-president-biden-on-the-end-of-the-war-in-afghanistan/

This article is written by AreaS member Robert Lewis Mikkelsen and was published by Cappelen Damm Updates in September 2021.